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ABSTRACT
The regress of liberal democracy in the world has been progressing for years and the number of countries 
with the full democracy index is decreasing [Economist Intelligence Unit 2018, 2019; Freedom House 2018]. 
One of the serious threats to the rule of law and the human rights in modern democracy has become discrim-
inatory legalism which is both strategy and weapon [Weyland 2013]. In order to weaken or marginalize the 
opposition and “rebellious” citizens, public authorities apply discriminatory legal instruments and democratic 
rules depending on who they are concerned with. Public authorities do this because of political views and use 
exclusion rhetoric, a language of hatred, stigmatizing all “strangers”, at last use hate speech on the Internet 
and beyond. The weaponization of hate speech is a convenient instrument for political struggle and the fight 
against inconvenient opponents. Hate speech is also used by far-right and nationalist organizations in the public 
sphere, which operate in an atmosphere of consent to their radical behaviour. Political hate speech plays an 
important role in the discriminatory legal strategy. Poland is included in the group of countries with flawed 
democracy (Article 7(1) TEU since 2017). The authorities introduced changes in law (which were defined 
as the “Frankensteinisation of legislation” by the Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe [PACE] in 
2019), democratic institutions and the prosecution applies a discriminatory legalism strategy. This problem 
is highlighted by the current Commissioner for Human Rights which is an independent institution in the 
field of fighting hate speech (except a few independent media and NGOs informing about the hate speech 
phenomenon). Many of hate speech cases are discontinued or not taken up by the prosecution. The numbers 
of cases of hate speech and hate incidents are increasing but the Polish authorities use the underreporting 
mechanism. The Ombudsman warns that only 5% of cases are reported to the police. The language of hatred 
and contempt used by the authorities in Poland has become the weaponization in the fight against citizens 
as political opponents: LGBT+ community, refugees, political opponents, independent judges and others.
Key words: Poland, discriminatory legalism, populism, hate speech, Commissioner for Human Rights, 
rule of law 
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INTRODUCTION
A dramatic change occurred in Polish constitutional politics in October 2015: 
a combined presidential and parliamentary victory of the populist Law and Justice 
party (PiS) began a series of deep political and legal changes which turned the con-
stitutional order on its head in many respects. The end of the year 2015 witnessed 
the beginning of a fundamental transformation: abandonment of various dogmas of 
liberal democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, which so far had been taken 
for granted. The campaign, first against the Constitutional Tribunal (CT) and then 
against the regular courts, rested upon the idea that any restraints upon the political 
majority are by their nature antidemocratic [Sadurski 2018: 1]. 
The political, social and legal situation has changed dramatically. The Parliament 
adopted many amendments against the concept of the democratic state of law in 
2015–2020.1 As a result of these developments, Poland, once a paradigm of a suc-
cessful transition into democracy in the 1990s, has become a pariah of the European 
Union [Matczak 2019: 407].
According to the Economist Intelligence Unit [2020], the ruling2 Law and Justice 
party, which won the October 2019 parliamentary election again, will continue to 
implement controversial, nationalist policies. Its failure to address the rule of law 
issues may prompt the EU to try to impose sanctions on Poland. The ongoing crisis of 
liberal democracy in Poland and the failure to promote, protect and enforce the rule 
of law, the human rights and non-discrimination have more universal and deep-seated 
causes. This crisis is not endemic to Poland because liberal democracy is in crisis 
everywhere.3 According to the 2019 Democracy Index, 76 of the 167 countries 
(45.5% of all countries) can be considered to be democracies. The number of “full 
1 The Parliament adopted the following amendments, e.g. the Civil Service Law in 2015 (higher civil 
service positions are filled by appointment rather than competition), the Public Prosecutor General Law in 
2016 (the position of independent Public Prosecutor General was combined with the Ministry of Justice), 
the Surveillance Law in 2015 (the law opens the possibility of uncontrolled downloading Internet data by 
the police and special services), eight amendments to the Supreme Court in 2016–2019, the amendments to 
the Law on the Common Courts, the Law on the Supreme Court and Some Other Laws (known as “muzzle 
law”) in 2019 (the amendments diminish judicial independence and put Polish judges into the situation of 
having to face disciplinary proceedings for decisions required by the ECHR, the law of the European Union, 
and other international instruments), the Assembly Law in 2016 (the amendments introduced controversial 
provisions on cyclical assemblies which are criticized [e.g. Amnesty International, the Helsinki Foundation 
for Human Rights], regulations are unclear, favor one type of assembly, the decisions about an organization 
of the demonstrations that should be taken locally are in the hands of government administration) [see 
more: Everything…].
2 The Polish government is co-created by: Law and Justice (Pol.: Prawo i Sprawiedliwość), a conser-
vative-nationalist party, leading the informal United Right (Pol.: Zjednoczona Prawica) governing coalition, 
Agreement (Pol.: Porozumienie) a conservative-liberal party and United Poland (Pol.: Solidarna Polska) 
a conservative-nationalist party.
3 According to The Economist Intelligence Unit’s measure of democracy, almost one-half (48.4%) 
of the world’s population live in a democracy of some sort, although only 5.7% reside in a “full democra-
cy”, down from 8.9% in 2015 as a result of the US being demoted from a “full democracy” to a “flawed 
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democracies” increased to 22 in 2019, up from 20 in 2018. The number of “flawed 
democracies” fell by one to 54 in 2019 [European Democracy Index 2019: 3]. And 
a wave of populism is sweeping across the advanced democracies in the northern 
hemisphere. Though in different forms and to different degrees, populism has begun 
to shape the political life of established democracies including the United States, 
the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Sweden, Greece, 
Italy, as well as, perhaps most spectacularly in Europe, the more recent democracies 
of Hungary and Poland [Lacey 2019: 4]. Right-wing populist parties are currently 
growing more rapidly than ever before and have increased their voter support with 
33% in four years [Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index 2019: 4]. 
One of the manifestations of populist policy is the use of the strategy of discrim-
inatory legalism which is also a weapon in the fight against political opponents but 
can also serve to create the myth of a homogeneous sovereign. The discriminatory 
legalism is used to colonize civil society, silence critical voices in the public sphere, 
and harass the opposition [de la Torre 2017: 1275]. When the institutions such as the 
judiciary are taken over or co-opted by populists, a situation arises, called by some 
scholars forms of “abusive constitutionalism” or “discriminatory” or “autocratic 
legalism” [Müller 2017], in which the law itself is used to persecute minorities, to 
punish dissent, and to enforce executive power discursively legitimized by the will 
of the people [Lacey 2019: 14].
The Polish populist government and the United Right politicians supported 
by, e.g. the Catholic Church, the selected organizations, the public media and the 
selected right-wing media that have become the beneficiaries of “the good change” 
since the 2015 parliamentary election use the exclusive, stigmatizing and hateful 
language against all the “strangers” and “others” who are political opponents of 
the ruling party. The term “good change” means the deep changes in almost every 
area of public life in Poland due to the national and conservative spirit. The LGBT 
community, refugees, Ukrainians, judges, protesting doctors, teachers, and NGOs 
leaders have become victims of hate speech in Poland. The phenomenon of hate 
speech is widely present in cyberspace, especially in the social media, the public 
media and in many political statements. And the atmosphere of consent is observed 
in the public sphere. The goal of this article is to present the scale and extent of the 
hate speech phenomenon used as an instrument or the weapon of the discriminatory 
legalism strategy on the example of LGBT community and refugees, lack of action 
on the part of the authorities, as well as to present the role of the Commissioner for 
Human Rights in its fight against hate speech in Poland. Unfortunately, the Polish 
Ombudsman is the isolated authority that undertakes the actions in Poland to com-
bat hate speech and to implement relevant education to counteract it. Almost every 
single independent institution in Poland is appropriated by the ruling party and its 
democracy” in 2016. More than one-third of the world’s population live under authoritarian rule, with 
a large share being in China [EIU, Democracy Index 2019: 3].
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supporters, beneficiaries of the “good change”. The Commissioner is appointed by 
the Sejm and approved by the Senate for a 5-year term. The current Ombudsman’s 
term ends in 2020.
METHODOLOGy
The author used system analysis, decision-making, comparative, quantitative 
behavioural and empirical methods. The analysis was conducted on the basis of 
reports of NGOs (e.g. the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, the European 
Front4), think tanks (e.g. the Stefan Batory Foundation, The Economist Intelligence 
Unit, Freedom House) and opinion polling centres (e.g. the Polish Public Opinion 
Research Centre). Legal documents, judicial, legal opinion and judgments regarding 
freedom of expression and hate speech (Venice Commission of the Council of Eu-
rope, European Courts of Human Rights, official statements of public institutes and 
authorities) were also examined. The author used the desk research method which 
is based on public documents, statistics, analysis reports and publications whose 
examination helps to develop a diagnosis of the scale of hate speech in Poland and 
the measures taken to prevent or combat this phenomenon. As part of the quantitative 
method, the author has analysed the statistical data of the Central Statistical Office. 
The analysis of the scale, dynamics and content of hate speech and fake news was 
made on the basis of observation of social behaviour based on the social listening 
method. This method is a quantitative and qualitative study of hate speech cases 
published in cyberspace. The streaming method is used to analyse the frequency of 
occurrence of computational propaganda in cyberspace. This method is relatively 
new in the field of computer science and extremely helpful for analysing the scale, 
dynamics, scope and content of public discourse on a selected topic. The author 
conducted an analysis on the basis of three reports of two NGOs – the Helsinki 
Foundation for Human Rights and the European Front.
RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS AS FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
The concept of a democratic state of law principle is fulfilled by a combination of 
the formal and the material elements [Dziemidok-Olszewska, Sokół 2012: 351–352]. 
The democratic rule of law is a state in which the law reflects the accepted value 
system, based on natural law and standards of international law. And what is espe-
cially important in the democratic state of law, the will of the majority (expressed 
4 The European Front is an informal initiative jointly created by pro-European non-governmental 
organizations, e.g. Prof. Bronisław Geremek Foundation, Robert Schuman Foundation. 
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in the form of an act), must, however, be consistent with constitutional law and may 
be overcome by the constitutional court. In other words, that role is fulfilled by the 
constitutional court and courts. Article 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland 
of 2 April 1997 ensures the principle of a democratic state of law: “The Republic of 
Poland shall be a democratic state ruled by law and implementing the principles of 
social justice”. The principle since its establishment has had a very important influ-
ence on the process of political transformation in Poland after 1989 throughout the 
transitional period until the adoption of the Constitution in 1997. This happened in 
particular through a case law and an interpretation of the Constitutional Tribunal. It 
is the general principle of the political system as a standard to which the Constitu-
tional Tribunal, as a result of the adoption of creative and dynamic interpretation of 
the system, described the basic catalogue of the necessary formal requirements and 
substantive. They constitute the “standard” democratic rule of law.
Article 2 of the Constitution contains the clause which had become the essen-
tial basis for the constitutionality of law and legal system in the period of political 
transformation in Poland. That rule of law framework and particular meta-rule are 
the catalogue of a number of other principles, each of which may be a spontaneous 
basis for assessing the constitutionality of acts. These principles are, e.g. citizens’ 
trust in the state (the loyal behaviour towards the citizens), lex retro non agit, the 
principle of acquired rights, social justice, the respect for the common good, the 
stable and secure rights (good and appropriate legislation), the principle of separation 
of powers, the judicial independence, the right to a fair trial and the prohibition of 
excessive interference by the legislature in individual rights. The adopted formula 
of the democratic rule of law is both a frame for the activities of legislative, execu-
tive and judicial powers as well as a set of values in which the civil society the best 
develops. The rights of every member of civil society in the state of the rule of law 
should be protected and respected by every single public authority. No one may be 
discriminated against on the basis of political views, nationality, ethnicity, sexual 
orientation and other. 
The rule of law is one of the common values upon which the European Union 
and part of the common constitutional traditions of all member states are founded. 
It is enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union. The European Com-
mission, together with all other EU institutions, is responsible under the Treaties for 
guaranteeing the rule of law as a fundamental value of our Union and making sure 
that EU law, values and principles are respected. Also, the rule of law means that all 
members of a society including governments and parliaments are equally subject to 
the law, under the control of independent courts, irrespective of political majorities. 
In the current constitutional crisis in Poland and the rule of law’s crisis, the European 
Commission triggered the rule of law framework to address systemic threats in EU 
countries. It means that the European Commission has to trigger the mechanisms 
of Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). This is done through dialogue 
with the EU country concerned. Unfortunately, for the first time in the history of 
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the functioning of the European Union, the mechanism of Article 7 was triggered 
against Poland in 2017 (“the Case of Poland”). But as Nicola Lacey rightly points 
out, the Article 7 infringement procedure invoked against Hungary and Poland could 
lead to sanctions, but may be liable to feed the very populism which underlies the 
problem it seeks to address. In the international sphere, perhaps even more than in 
the national one, the robustness of norms of legality, such as human rights, is substan-
tially dependent on voluntary compliance [Lacey 2019: 16–17]. However, it seems 
that the respect for the human rights, the principle of equality and the prohibition 
of the discrimination are not a priority for the Polish public authorities. Because the 
nation in the rhetoric of Law and Justice is a collective good, the good of the nation 
is interpreted as standing above the good of the individual, and the realization of the 
good of the nation becomes the realization of the good of the individual, its individual 
rights become subordinated to the rights of the nation.
Many changes in law regarding judiciary were justified as allegedly inspired by 
solutions already adopted in other EU countries. This tactic is called by the Council 
of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly5 as “Frankensteinisation of legislation”. This is 
a process in which the Polish governing majority selects certain elements of judiciary 
systems in other countries and uses it to undermine the independence of the judiciary. 
It is based on a combination of “worst practises” existing in other countries, instead 
of on best practise and common European standards [Parliamentary Assembly 2019: 
3]. But in fact, these amendments were to lead to the change in the mentioned para-
digm in the relationship between the authority and the individual and the change of 
the priority of the good of the nation over the good of the individual. 
The populist government in Poland maximizes its electoral chances and strives 
to secure public support by using the “mass clientism” instruments, as exemplified 
by numerous social transfers for the groups that can provide the electoral support, 
including the “Family 500+” programme, the thirteenth pension, “300+” (the “Good 
Start” programme), the electoral promise of the fourteenth pension in 2019. On the 
one hand, the government delivers the monthly benefit of PLN 500 to every family 
with two or more children (the key plank of 2015 Law and Justice campaign), then, 
in 2019, the programme has been extended to families with one child. But on the 
other hand, the government and Law and Justice politicians have systematically 
applied the strategy of discriminatory legalism to create a homogeneous sovereign 
myth for ad hoc political goals. Like any modern populist right-wing party, Law and 
Justice also uses a language that is discriminatory, stigmatizing, excluding, and full 
of contempt. This language used by populists is an essential element of discrimi-
natory legalism which is both a strategy and weapon. But, it should be noticed that 
5 In 2019, the PACE adopted a resolution concerning the functioning of democratic institutions in 
Poland. The adoption of the resolution ends 4-year proceedings focusing on rule of law developments in 
Poland, however, at the same time, the resolution opens a full monitoring procedure in respect of Poland 
(as well as of Turkey, Albania, or Georgia). 
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discriminatory legalism violates human rights. First of all, it violates human dignity. 
Article 30 of the Polish Constitution states that: “The inherent and inalienable dignity 
of the person shall constitute a source of freedoms and rights of persons and citizens. 
It shall be inviolable. The respect and protection thereof shall be the obligation of 
public authorities”. Thus, the authorities violate the Constitution of Poland by using 
discriminatory legalism.
DISCRIMINATORy LEGALISM – STRATEGy AND WEAPON 
OF AUTHORITARIAN POPULISTS
Jan-Werner Müller sees populism as a form of exclusionary identity politics 
which tends to undermine democracy and identifies three distinct manifestations of 
its logic: a kind of colonization of the state, mass clientelism as well as what politi-
cal scientists sometimes call “discriminatory legalism”, and, finally, the systematic 
repression of civil society [Müller 2016: 28]. The populist politician’s claim to 
express the people’s will does not brook any system of checks and balances such as 
that envisaged by modern constitutionalism, for the latter is premised on a pluralist 
view of politics. Moreover, the polarized and moralistic, friend/enemy, “pure us/
corrupt them” tenor of populism tends to erode the usual norms of civility [Lacey 
2019: 13] and avoid, criticize and do not apply the rules of political correctness. 
Populist politicians have applied discriminatory legalism and its maxim “For my 
friends, everything; for my enemies, the law!” They take control of all major insti-
tutions including the courts, they have used formally legal authority in discretionary 
ways to promote their cronies and allies while punishing or intimidating critics 
and opponents in politics and society. With the government controlling all avenues 
of appeal and avoiding blatant violations of formal rules, those targeted find few 
chances for domestic recourse or the gathering of international support [Weyland 
2013: 23]. For the rule of law not only constrains but enables governmental power, 
and populist governments need law as much as any other regime. Hence courts and 
other checking institutions need to be co-opted – as they may be by court-packing, 
intimidation of the judiciary or other mechanisms such as those which are recently 
observed in Poland and Hungary [Lacey 2019: 13–14].
Discriminatory legalism is the weapon used against anyone who does not share 
the point of view of populist politicians. It is an extra dangerous weapon especially 
in the era of omnipresent communication and information technologies, in particular 
social media. Social media are young, but they have already played a role in numerous 
turbulent protests and highly polarized elections in several countries. Social media 
have often been described as the site for the conflict between “good” democratic forces 
who use social media to make their voices heard and “bad’’ autocratic and repressive 
forces who aim to censor this channel to silence these liberal elements [Tucker et al. 
2017: 47]. Freedom of information online and offline is an inherently democratic 
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principle but social media are neither inherently democratic nor inherently undem-
ocratic. Rather, social media constitute a space in which political interests battle for 
influence, and not all these interests are liberal or democratic [Tucker et al. 2017: 48].
Populist politicians use discriminatory legalism to control both the media, which 
play a public watchdog function in a democratic society, and independent organi-
zations. Consequently, the space for civil society is gradually diminishing, among 
other things due to problems with access to free media including public media, as 
well as restrictions on financing of independent NGOs. The leaders of social move-
ments, NGOs, and some economic, cultural elites and scientists are attacked as the 
enemies of the changes introduced by politicians using the strategy of discriminatory 
legalism. There can be observed the consequent process of the capture of state and 
independent democratic institutions, including the independent judges who are the 
guardians of the democratic civil liberties and the principle of non-discrimination.
HATE SPEECH CASES AND THE “ATMOSPHERE OF CONSENT” IN POLAND
In Europe’s culturally diverse societies there is a need to reconcile the right to 
freedom of expression with other rights, such as freedom of belief, conscience or 
religion, which might sometimes compete with each other. It is a difficult challenge 
because these rights are at the core of democracy. Article 10 of the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom of 4 November 1950 (Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights) states that: “Everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression, including freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information 
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers”.
However, the Convention also provides that the exercise of these freedoms car-
ries with it duties and responsibilities, and establishes that some limitations of these 
rights, including the protection of the reputation or rights of others, may in certain 
circumstances be possible. This regulation means that freedom of expression is not 
absolute and this freedom may be restricted, e.g. due to the need to guarantee the 
protection of human dignity. Hate speech, i.e. an offence of a racist, anti-Semitic, 
xenophobic, Islamophobic, homophobic, etc. nature must be banned because of the 
rights of persons who are members of a pluralist democratic society. 
The European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg stated that hate speech that 
may offend individuals or groups cannot claim any protection under Article 10. Of 
great significance is also Article 17 which prevents applicants from relying on the 
Convention on Human Rights (1950) in order to perform, promote and/or justify 
acts amounting to or characterized by, e.g. hatred, violence, xenophobia and racial 
discrimination, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, terrorism and war crimes, negation 
and revision of clearly established historical facts, such as the Holocaust, contempt 
for victims of the Holocaust, of a war and/or of a totalitarian regime, totalitarian 
ideology and other political ideas incompatible with democracy. And when assess-
THE DISCRIMINATORy LEGALISM STRATEGy AND HATE SPEECH CASES IN POLAND… 135
ing an applicant’s conduct and aims, in the light of Article 17, the European Court 
of Human Rights takes into account the values proclaimed and guaranteed by the 
European Convention, particularly as expressed in its Preamble as well as the values 
underlying the Convention such as: justice and peace, effective political democracy, 
peaceful settlement of international conflicts and sanctity of human life, tolerance, 
social peace and non-discrimination, gender equality and coexistence of members of 
society free from racial segregation6 [Guide on Article 17, 2019: 9–10]. Article 17 of 
the Convention calls for the so-called guillotine effect, i.e. the complaint is declared 
inadmissible and it is not examined in detail. The examination of the complaint under 
this Article is included in the procedure for examining the admissibility of a com-
plaint before the European Court. This provision remains reserved for particularly 
drastic cases of abuse of rights and freedoms contained in the Convention, and such 
manifestations are most often taken to be anti-Semitism, racism and xenophobia.
As defined by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in 1997, hate 
speech shall be understood as covering all forms of expression which spread, incite, 
promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred 
based on intolerance, including intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and 
ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of 
immigrant origin [Recommendation No. R (97) 20]. There is no universally agreed 
definition. Most countries have adopted legislations banning expressions that can be 
included in this concept, but with the slight differences as the important part of the 
militant democracy doctrine or democracy able to defend itself [Loewenstein 1937]. 
There are many regulations regarding hate speech in Poland, e.g. Article 13 of the Con-
stitution of Poland (1997) and in particular three articles in the Criminal Code (1997).7
Pursuant to Article 13 of the Constitution of Poland, “political parties and other 
organizations whose programmes are based upon totalitarian methods and the modes 
of activity of Nazism, fascism and communism, as well as those whose programmes 
or activities sanction racial or national hatred, […] shall be forbidden”. 
Article 119 of the Criminal Code states that: “Whoever uses violence or makes 
unlawful threat towards a group of persons or a particular individual because of their 
6 See more the HUDOC database of the Court’s case-law and, e.g. cases: Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 
§§ 115 and 230; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, § 106; Jersild v. Denmark, § 35; Glimmerveen and 
Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, Commission decision; Féret v. Belgium; W.P. and Others v. Poland; Norwood 
v. the United Kingdom (dec.); Seurot v. France (dec.); Leroy v. France, § 27; M’Bala M’Bala v. France (dec.); 
Garaudy v. France (dec.); Vajnai v. Hungary, § 25; Fáber v. Hungary, § 58; Vona v. Hungary, § 36; Vajnai 
v. Hungary, § 25; Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey [GC], § 132; German Communist 
Party (KPD) v. Germany, Commission decision and others [Guide on Article 17, 2019].
7 yet Article 212.1 of the Penal Code states: “Whoever accuses another person, a group of persons, 
an institution, a legal person or an organisational unit having no legal personality of conduct or features 
which may humiliate them in public opinion or expose them to a loss of trust required in a given position, 
profession or type of activity, shall be punishable by a fine or restriction of personal freedom. Article 212.2 
states: Whoever commits the offence specified in Article 212.1 by means of mass communication, shall be 
punishable by a fine, restriction of personal of liberty or term of imprisonment of up to one year”.
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national, ethnic, political or religious affiliation, or because of their lack of religious 
beliefs, shall be subject to the penalty of the deprivation of liberty for a term of 
between 3 months and 5 years” (§ 1). “The same punishment shall be imposed on 
anyone, who incites commission of the offence specified under § 1” (§ 2).
Article 256 of the Criminal Code states that: “Whoever publicly promotes a fas-
cist or other totalitarian system of state or incites hatred based on national, ethnic, 
race or religious differences or for reason of lack of any religious denomination shall 
be subject to a fine, the penalty of restriction of liberty or the penalty of deprivation 
of liberty for up to 2 years” (§ 1).
Article 257 of the Criminal Code states: “Whoever publicly insults a group 
within the population or a particular person because of his national, ethnic, race or 
religious affiliation or because of his lack of any religious denomination or for these 
reasons breaches the personal inviolability of another individual shall be subject to 
the penalty of deprivation of liberty for up to 3 years” (§ 1).
Unfortunately, there is no prohibition of hate speech because of sexual orientation, 
disability, gender and others. Under the Polish law, it is possible to initiate civil causes 
of action in response to instances of hate speech under the provisions of the Civil Code. 
Article 23 provides protection to “the personal interests of a human being”, includ-
ing, inter alia, freedom and dignity. Under Article 24(1), aggrieved individuals can 
“demand that the action at issue ceases unless it is not unlawful”; or “demand that the 
person responsible for the infringement performs the necessary actions to negate its 
effects”, in particular, to make “a declaration of the appropriate form and substance” 
(e.g. statement of apologize). They are also entitled to claim “monetary compensation 
or the payment of an appropriate amount of money to a specific public cause” or “to 
demand that the damage be remedied in accordance with general principles”. 
From 2015 to 2020, a considerable increase can be seen in the percentage of 
persons encountering hate speech in media and in everyday life. In 2016, the most 
common victims of hate speech were refugees8 and gay persons. According to the 
Centre for Research on Prejudice at the University of Warsaw, hate speech rela-
tively often was disseminated against Muslims, Romani people and black persons. 
Hate speech is predominantly encountered by Poles on the Internet (in particular by 
youth), on TV (mainly adults) and in everyday interactions on the streets [Winiew-
ski et al. 2016: 3]. According to the researchers from the Helsinki Foundation for 
Human Rights, a common feature of anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim, anti-refugee and 
8 The refugee phenomenon concerns Poland to a much lesser extent than other EU member states, 
both in terms of the number of applications and people actually residing there. Between 2015 and 2018, 
Poles have changed from cautious supporters to decisive opponents of admitting refugees into the country 
[Łaciak, Segeš Frelak 2018: 9]. In the early stages of the refugee crisis, Poles were less sceptical than 
citizens of other countries in Central and Eastern Europe with 60% opposed to admitting any refugees and 
29% of those who agree to admit them temporarily into Poland [Public Opinion Research Centre, 2018: 
1]. In 2018, there were 4,100 applications for international protection submitted in the Republic of Poland 
but the refugee status was granted to 406 foreigners [Office for Foreigners 2018].
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anti-LGBT+ community narratives was the presentation of these groups as a threat 
to social order, security, the culture and traditions of Poland and the Polish family 
[Mikulska-Jolles 2018: 33–34; 2020: 3]. But in 2019, the term “LGBT+” somewhat 
replaced the sinister figure of a refugee from 2015. Unlike refugees, however, the 
LGBT+ community is actually present in Poland. 
From 2015 to 2020, there was (and still is) a smear campaign against the LGBT+ 
community, refugees, some judges, opposition politicians and other groups in Poland. 
The term “smear campaign” means “a planned attempt to harm the reputation of a per-
son or company by telling lies about them” [Cambridge Dictionary]. For example, 
there were many pejorative metaphors and the hateful words addressed in the pub-
lic debate towards the LGBT+ community (e.g. “decontamination after the LGBT+ 
march”, “rainbow plague”, “child sexualization by LGBT+”, LGBT+ as a “homo-lob-
by”, “homo-terror”, “homo-propaganda”, and “homo-revolution”, the Pride March 
as “a promotion of perversions, deviations and denaturing”),9 towards the migrants 
(e.g. “demographic and social jihad”, “refugees spread germs and disease”,10 “every 
refugee is a terrorist”, “refugees murder and rape women and children”),11 and towards 
the judges (e.g. “judges who are common thieves”).12 For example, in January 2020, 
President Andrzej Duda used the language referring to ethnic cleansing and pogroms: 
“We must cleanse our Polish home so that it would be clean, orderly, and beautiful”. 
These metaphors give rise to negative and dangerous emotions and they evoke the worst 
associations of the past and gradually and systematically brutalize the public debate. 
They can encourage physical attacks on discredited people, which was the case, for 
example, in Białystok, Lublin, and Częstochowa during the 2019 Equality Marches. 
In addition to hate speech, which was present in the public debate, also fake 
news and disinformation (including online disinformation)13 created a new kind of 
9 Przemysław Czarnek (former voivode of the Lublin Voivodeship; in 2019, elected as an MP, as 
a representative of the ruling Law and Justice Party), has described the 2018 Lublin Equality March as 
promoting “perversions, deviations and denaturing” and he has contributed to the incitement of violence by 
right-wing groups against the march participants in 2018. Also he has made public statements in relation to 
Ukrainians and Muslims and has framed gender as an ideology. Bart Staszewski, the leader of the Lublin 
Equality March, won in the civil court and Czarnek had to apologize for his words. 
10 In 2015, the leader of the Law and Justice party said that “migrants carry parasites and protozoa” 
as well as “very dangerous diseases long absent from Europe”. It turned the migrant crisis into a political 
issue [Cienski 2015]. 
11 On the examples of metaphors about refugees and migrants in public debate in 2015–2017, see 
more: Wigura, Bertram, Puchejda [2017].
12 In 2017, Stanisław Piotrowicz (the key figure taking part in of the Polish reform of judiciary, 
former prosecutor, now a member of the Constitutional Tribunal) used this statement in relation to the 
Polish judges. In December 2019, the Warsaw District Court has convicted a pro-government official for 
violating the good name of the First President of the Supreme Court, who sued him for calling Poland’s 
judges “ordinary thieves”.
13 The High Level Expert Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation (HLEG) prefers the 
word “disinformation” over “fake news”. The HLEG defines this term as “all forms of false, inaccurate, or 
misleading information designed, presented and promoted to intentionally cause public harm or for profit” 
[A Multi-Dimensional… 2018: 3].
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propaganda in the information society. Computational propaganda is disseminated 
in cyberspace. Samuel C. Woolley and Philip N. Howard call this new kind of prop-
aganda “digital misinformation and manipulation”. The computational propaganda 
describes the use of algorithms, automation, and human curation to purposefully 
manage and distribute misleading information over social media networks [Wool-
ley, Howard 2019: 4]. The black market for social media manipulation tools and 
services is open and available both in Poland (through the Internet, e.g. via Google, 
Bing, yahoo) and other countries, which is also noticed by researchers from NATO 
StratCom [Bay, Reynolds 2018].
Anna Mierzyńska analysed the social media accounts of selected media in Po-
land, including the public media accounts in 2019 (television and radio). According 
to the scientist, 353 tweets containing the abbreviation LGBT with the negative 
comments appeared on the Polish Radio’s accounts. On average, one tweet with 
a negative comment appeared every day. There were slightly fewer of them on the 
Polish Television account, i.e. 275 a year. Their range was 33 million mentions (in 
the case of the Polish Radio – 1.5 million mentions). These numbers concerned only 
mentions of LGBT. In 2019, the TVP accounts were leaders as far as the number of 
those negative mentions is concerned. In addition, there were 178 comments on the 
TVP Facebook account and their range was 7.3 million [Mierzyńska 2020].
According to the European Front, the source of disinformation in the social 
media were primarily Polish political actors, although the content they disseminate 
was often convergent with pro-Kremlin disinformation. The content published by 
the politicians of the ruling coalition in social media was calculated to consolidate 
existing divisions and they most effectively used polarization and the fear manage-
ment [Grabarczyk, Mazurkiewicz, Patrick 2019: 6]. For example, analysing the 
appearance of the topic of migration and asylum in the 2019 election campaign, 
from the perspective of possible disinformation, one could notice the presence of 
narrative schemes regarding alleged threats associated with the presence of people 
from Muslim countries in Western Europe. In particular, statements about a rise of 
crimes and rapes of European women committed by migrants or refugees, Sharia 
and no-go zones in some European cities were presented by some politicians running 
for election. In addition, using the term “LGBT ideology” by some church officials 
and other political actors should be considered as spreading disinformation. In the 
colloquial Polish language, “ideology” refers to false consciousness and someone’s 
particular personal interest, therefore, the entwining the LGBT+ acronym with the 
word “ideology” was a rhetorical attempt to deprecate the postulates of the LGBT+ 
community in Poland. Even though these related primarily to ensuring equal rights 
and combating discrimination, during debates, they were fought with the imprecise 
but sinister slogan “LGBT ideology” [Mikulska-Jolles 2020: 3]. Among numerous 
hate speech cases, the following deserve to be highlighted:
– in 2019, Onet.pl revealed the existence of an organized online trolling cam-
paign aimed to discredit Polish judges. This smear campaign was coordinated by the 
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Ministry of Justice (known as the “Piebiak Gate” or the “Piebiak Scandal”). One of 
the professional trolls (known as “Emilia”) had been regularly posting material on 
Twitter (from the The CasteWatch / The JusticeWatch account, in Polish: KastaWatch) 
about the judges whose rulings and public comments were critical of government 
policy (e.g. “F… off! you are bringing shame on honest judges and dishonour to 
Poland”). Onet’s investigations reached the Supreme Court and a smear campaign 
against the First President of Poland’s Supreme Court and the President of the Polish 
Judges Association “Iustitia”. One of the most common Twitter accounts linked the 
KastaWatch account with the accounts of judges from the current National Council 
of the Judiciary whose status is being undermined. The persecuted judges among 
other former spokesman for the National Council of the Judiciary sued those judges 
for libel and stalking [Pankowska 2019]. The case of the KastaWatch scandal was 
still pending at the end of 2020,
– the prosecutor’s office has discontinued the investigation regarding a manifes-
tation from November 2017, when its organisers hanged photos on gallows, showing 
MEPs who had voted for the European Parliament’s resolution regarding the rule 
of law in Poland. The manifestation was organised by nationalistic circles “Stop 
Contemporary Targowica” (among others: The All-Polish youth [Pol.: Młodzież 
Wszechpolska]). The prosecutor’s office argued that the manifestation was organ-
ized “in defence of national and patriotic values” (the inscription was referred to the 
history of the confederation of Polish and Lithuanian magnates who opposed the 
Constitution of 3 May 1791) and according to the prosecutor, the organizers did not 
break the law (after the long time over the two years of conducting investigation). 
In terms of moral and ethical categories, the prosecution has critically assessed the 
way of expressing their viewpoint. The prosecutor’s office informed that the perfor-
mance that had included hanging portraits of politicians on constructions imitating 
gallows had a symbolic character, referring to historical events from the 18th century, 
portrayed in a painting by Jan Piotr Norblin and in the intention of the organizers the 
performance was to draw an analogy between the Targowica Confederation and the 
MEPs voting for the resolution. But it should be noted the inquiry was conducted 
into possible violence of threat against a group of people or a person due to their 
political views (Article 119 of the Criminal Code),
– in 2019, the prosecutor’s office closed the investigation regarding fake “certifi-
cates of political death” of 11 mayors of Polish cities because, according to the pros-
ecutor, the documents did not contain any threats and were an expression of opinion. 
In 2017, the All-Polish youth prepared and published online “certificates of political 
death” of 11 Polish city mayors who have signed a declaration for co-operation on mi-
gration and expressed their willingness to accept refugees. Among those 11 city mayors 
was Paweł Adamowicz, the mayor of Gdańsk who died after being stabbed while on 
stage during the finale of the Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity. It should be noticed 
that the assailant seized a microphone and declared that he was seeking revenge against 
the opposition Civic Platform (the party to which Adamowicz previously belonged) for 
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his imprisonment and “torture”. In addition, it should be added that both Jerzy Owsiak 
(the founder of the Orchestra) and Adamowicz were the objects of the smear campaign 
on the part of the nationalist press and the public media who perceived the Orchestra as 
a leftist organization, and Adamowicz as the opponent of “the good change”, the friend 
of LGBT+ community and migrants. Unfortunately, the assassination of Adamowicz 
revealed political polarization of the public sphere in Poland,
– every year, xenophobic phrases and far-right symbols are exposed during the 
Independence March on 11 November, especially since 2016 (around 60,000 people 
joined) organized by the far-right and nationalist groups. During the Independence 
March, some attendants called for “White Europe”, “White Race”, or “Clean Blood”. 
There could be seen such statements as “every refugee is terrorist”, “Poland for 
Poles”, “Islam – death of white Europe” and “The whole of Poland shouts with us, 
kill Islam with machetes”. No one has been convicted of stirring up hatred. On the 
other hand, the women who were sitting on the route of the March with the banners 
reading “Stop fascism” were convicted. They were kicked and insulted by vulgar 
words. The prosecutor discontinued the proceedings against the organizers of the 
Independence March because they were responsible for ensuring safety during the 
demonstration. According to the court’s judgment, the purpose of the attacks against 
the protesting women was not to hurt them but to “show dissatisfaction”,
– in 2018, shortly before the elections, the Law and Justice party released a vid-
eo in which they urged the Poles to choose “safe local government” and reject the 
Civic Platform party which, according to the ruling party, planned to take in droves 
of refugees. Fictional news clips showed images of migrants rioting in ransacked 
Polish cities, with the voice-over describing Poland in 2020 with “enclaves of Mus-
lim refugees” (no-go zones), a place where “sexual assaults and acts of aggression 
have become part of everyday life (see the video #BezpiecznySamorzad on Twitter), 
– an LGBT+ ideology-free zone (Polish: Strefa wolna od ideologii LGBT+), 
also referred to as LGBT+ free zone (Polish: Strefa wolna od LGBT+), is a region 
which declared itself free of LGBT+ ideology as a result of an act passed by a Polish 
municipality, county or voivodeship. The declared LGBT+ ideology-free zones, 
although only symbolic, represent an attempt to stigmatize and exclude members 
of the LGBT+ community and are an expression of symbolic violence and approval 
of hate speech in Poland towards non-heteronormative people. As of January 2020, 
around 80 different LGBT+ ideology-free zone declarations have been made in 
Poland, including voivodeships in the south-east and central parts of the country: 
Małopolskie, Podkarpackie, Świętokrzyskie and Lubelskie [LGBT-Free Zones Pro-
ject]14 (see Figure 1).
14 In December 2019, the European Parliament voted (463 to 107) in favour of condemning more than 
80 such zones. The European Parliament regretted: “The fact that LGBT+ people experience bullying and 
harassment that begins at school and urges the Commission and the Member States to take concrete actions 
to end discrimination against LGBT+ people, which can lead to their being bullied, abused or isolated, in 
particular in educational settings” [European Parliament Resolution of 18 December 2019…]. 
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Figure 1. Map of the discriminatory resolutions of local governments against LGBT+ ideology or Regional 
Charters of Family Rights in Poland (2020)
Red colour means regions with adopted resolutions (or declarations), green – rejected ones and yellow – lobbing activities.
Source: Atlas nienawiści [Atlas of Hate], https://atlasnienawisci.pl/ (access: 29.02.2020).
According to available statistics, since 2015, the number of cases related to 
Articles 119(1), 256, and 257 reported to the police has significantly increased. This 
increase corresponded with the rise of xenophobic and racist incidents in Poland. 
What is more, the number of reported cases of online hate speech has significantly 
increased [New… 2019]. For example, according to the National Prosecutor’s Office, 
1,449 proceedings for crimes committed for racist, anti-Semitic or xenophobic rea-
sons were registered in 2017 (350 proceedings regarding Article 119 of the Criminal 
Code, 544 – regarding Article 256 of the Criminal Code, 536 – regarding Article 257). 
But the Commissioner for Human Rights in Poland and the ODIHR / OSCE noted 
that only 5% of hate crimes were reported to the police [Hate Crime Reporting 2019].
It should be noted that in August 2019, the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination was deeply concerned about the low percentage of offenses 
of hate speech and hate crimes that were reported by the public authorities, despite 
the recorded increase in the incidence of such crimes, and about the fact that some 
of the reported racially motivated crimes remained unregistered and not investigated 
as such. According to the Committee, the increased number of preparatory proceed-
ings and indictments of perpetrators of racist crimes did not result in a significant 
increase in the number of convictions. In addition, it remains concerned about the 
lack of detailed information on investigations and prosecutions of, and convictions 
for, racist hate speech and hate crimes, especially those committed by public figures 
and politicians [Concluding… 2019: 3]. This lack of data which the Committee 
informed about should be called the “underreporting mechanism”.
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Furthermore, while noting the criminalization of hate crimes and hate speech in 
Articles 119, 256 and 257 of the Criminal Code, the Committee was concerned also 
that “colour” and “descent” as grounds for inciting hatred were missing from this 
definition. It noticed the prevalence of racist hate speech against minority groups, in 
particular Muslims, Roma, Ukrainians, people of African and Asian descent, Jews 
and migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers. It was also concerned that leading public 
figures, including politicians and media officials, are frequently the source of such 
offensive statements or fail in their responsibility to strongly denounce hate speech 
[Concluding… 2019: 4]. The Committee urged the authorities to ensure effective 
enforcement of the laws declaring illegal parties or organizations which promote or 
incite racial discrimination, such as the National Movement, the National-Radical 
Camp, All-Polish youth, Falanga, Szturmowcy, Niklot, the National and Social 
Congress, Autonomic Nationalists, Pride and Modernity Association and the local 
chapter of Blood and Honour [Concluding… 2019: 4].
All the incidents of hate speech listed above, as well as those unmentioned in this 
article, testify to the creation of a certain atmosphere of consent for the dissemination 
of hate speech in public debate against all the political opponents and other people 
who oppose or criticize the current authorities. As already noted, the public media and 
the organizations supporting the Law and Justice party, such as Ordo Iuris, approved 
the “atmosphere of consent” for the spread of the hate speech in the public debate.
THE ROLE OF THE COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN FIGHTING 
DISCRIMINATION
The Commissioner for Human Rights (hereafter referred to as “the Commission-
er”) is the constitutional authority for legal control and protection. In his activities, 
the Commissioner is integral and independent from other state authorities. The Polish 
Commissioner (Ombudsman) operates on the basis of two legal acts, namely the Con-
stitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997 and the Act on the Commissioner 
for Human Rights of 15 July 1987. The Commissioner checks the facts presented 
by a complainant, but may also request another supervisory body to investigate the 
case. The Commissioner may examine the case right away or request the case files or 
information about the status of the case to be delivered by any institution concerned. 
Having examined the case and confirmed that human and citizen rights or freedoms 
have been infringed, the Commissioner refers the request to the competent authority, 
organisation or institution whose actions led to the infringement, or to a superior 
authority to ensure redress for the infringement, and monitors implementation of 
the recommended actions. The Commissioner may lodge a last resort appeal with 
the Supreme Court in a penal case and may participate in constitutional complaint 
proceedings before the Constitutional Tribunal. The Commissioner may also exer-
cise other powers laid down in the Commissioner for Human Rights Act (Articles 
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14–16). Having examined a case, the Commissioner may demand that preparatory 
proceedings be instituted by a competent prosecutor in cases involving offences 
prosecuted ex officio on the basis of Article 14(5). 
So, the mandate of the Commissioner includes: monitoring, supporting, and 
promoting equal treatment, carrying out independent research on the topic of dis-
crimination, preparing and publishing reports, and making recommendations on 
discrimination-related issues. He is required to present information on his activities 
related to equal treatment, including proposals and recommendations in this area 
to both chambers of parliament on an annual basis. Also he is further able to act 
ex officio or in response to applications or complaints received from concerned 
individuals. 
The Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights is an auxiliary unit, ensures 
the execution of the Commissioner’s tasks laid down in the Act on the Commissioner 
for Human Rights. The Commissioner manages the Office with the help of three Dep-
uty Commissioners for Human Rights. Within the Office, the Local Representatives 
in Gdańsk, Katowice and Wrocław, appointed by the Commissioner, are functioning. 
The Office includes 17 statutory organisational units, within which departments and 
sections operate. There were 287 employees in 2019.
The Polish Commissioner is very concerned about the scale, the scope and the 
dynamics of the hate speech and hate crimes phenomenon. In his speech delivered 
at the Third National Congress on Human Rights in December 2019, he noticed 
that: “The whole political and media discourse is currently swamped with per-
sonal attacks, »news of the day« coming from political parties, scandals, mutual 
allegations, everyday ping-pong between several political groups” [Human rights 
2035:…]. In the years 2015–2020, the Polish Ombudsman kept dedicated records 
on complaints related to hate speech. Importantly, the Commissioner and his office 
additionally undertook various positive measures aimed at tackling hate speech in 
Poland. For example:
– maintaining contact with the National Broadcasting Council, the editorial 
boards of the Polish media, the Council of Media Ethics, and representatives of 
social media platforms and NGOs, experts and journalists, 
– initiating dialogue on the need to combat hate speech in public discourse; e.g. 
in February 2017, the Commissioner’s Office organised a debate with editorial boards 
focusing on the image of the Muslim community as portrayed in the press, at which 
a report that had been ordered by the Commissioner, entitled “The Negative Image 
of Muslims in the Polish Press” was launched,
– taking the initiative titled “Twenty recommendations on effective fight against 
hate speech” in 2019 whose purpose should be a multi-dimensional cooperation with 
numerous public institutions and organizations to develop a strategy on preventing 
hate speech at the legal, cultural, political educational level,
– taking the initiative titled “30 examples of hate speech cases in which the 
prosecutor’s office raises the Ombudsman’s doubts” in cooperation with the Open 
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Republic15 in 2019. The Ombudsman intervened, among others, in the cases of 
promoting racism, fascist regime and public hate speech which were discontinued 
by the prosecutor’s office, e.g. the case of anti-migrant marches of the All-Polish 
youth and the National-Radical Camp in Białystok, Warsaw, Wrocław, Hajnówka 
and others during which incitement to hatred, and anti-democratic symbols were 
presented (e.g. Celtic cross, Falanga and other fascist symbols). He also intervened 
on a number of occasions, e.g. public statements of hate speech made by a former 
Catholic priest, certificates of political death, the Independence March 2016–2018, 
clips titled “safe local government”,
– cooperating with social media, especially with Facebook, in order to develop 
standards of protection against “hate speech” on their platforms, including imple-
mentation of the European Code of Conduct on countering illegal hate speech online, 
drafted by the European Commission in 2016,
– adopting the position of the Commissioner on the adoption by the public ad-
ministration entities of declarations opposing the LGBT ideology; the Ombudsman 
expressed his strong opposition to these declarations and announced that he would 
lodge a complaint to the administrative court,
– promoting the space for debate among various stakeholders in the media envi-
ronment, including social media, human rights organisations, politicians, and public 
authorities. For example, he set up Anti-Hate Platforms to operate at national and 
local levels.
Unfortunately, despite the positive efforts of the current Commissioner, including 
in cases of hate speech, he is often criticised and undermined by politicians of the 
ruling party and his Office faced a budgetary reduction. The expenditure on current 
operations decreased drastically – over PLN 37 million in 2014–2015 and PLN 
34 million in 2016–2018 [Commissioner’s budget 2020]. The Ombudsman is also 
sometimes undermined by the law enforcement authorities. The prosecutors interfere 
in court cases concerning LGBT+ persons that are dealt with by the Commissioner. 
Prosecutors join the proceedings, and they allegedly do so, but not to support the 
victims but “as a way to control what is happening or to represent the opposing 
party”. A new trend has been noticed by the Ombudsman and other actors engaged 
in LGBT+ issues, all court cases in relation to the rights of LGBT+ persons that 
are dealt with by the office of the Ombudsman attract attention of the prosecution 
services [Bojarski 2018: 149].
15 The Open Republic is the association which takes actions against anti-Semitism and Xenophobia. 
It was established in 1999 as an expression of the need to counteract xenophobic and anti-Semitic prejudice 
reappearing in the Polish public life, http://www.otwarta.org/en/about-association/ (access: 17.03.2020).
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CONCLUSIONS
Democracy depends on the rule of law. However, the ruling coalition treats the 
Polish judiciary as a mere obstacle to exercising power [Applebaum 2020]. Any 
person who does not share the views of the ruling coalition and performs the public 
functions, e.g. the President justice of the Supreme Court, the Human Rights Com-
missioner, the Marshal of Senate, the journalists who play their watchdog role, NGOs 
leaders, etc. are perceived as opponents. Since 2015, the ruling party is supported 
by the public media, Radio Maryja,16 independent organizations, such as the Ordo 
Iuris Institute, and finally by some Church representatives. 
The phenomenon of racism, anti-Semitism and other examples of hatred is not 
new in Poland, but mainstreaming of racist, anti-Semitic, homophobic and other 
hateful, stigmatizing or excluding narratives should be partially attributed to the 
current United Right coalition. Nationalism expressed through racist, anti-Semitism, 
anti-Ukrainian, homophobic and Islamophobic sentiments has become the main-
stream in Polish public media, including the selected far-right media, the nationalist 
groups’ social media accounts and in the public debate. Unfortunately, Polish populist 
politicians use a lot of hate speech statements against the judges, refugees, LGBT+ 
community, migrants from Ukraine, feminists, protesting teachers or support online 
smear and hatred campaign for political reasons, in order to win the parliamentary 
elections in 2015, local elections in 2018 and, finally, to win re-election in 2019. 
This strategy, known as the discriminatory strategy violates the Polish Constitution 
and the general principles of the liberal democracy – the rule of law, human rights 
protection and the prohibition of discrimination.
There is a climate of acceptance of extreme nationalist ideology, and of the “at-
mosphere of consent” for hate speech against the enemies of the Law and Justice’s 
reforms but also the enemies of the Polish nation. Therefore, the language of hatred, 
hostility and exclusion became both the weapon and strategy for populist politicians 
to introduce their vision of the great Polish nation. The mechanism of the hate speech 
carousel and the phenomenon of “weaponization of information” used against anyone 
who is a public critic of government are watched in Poland. Thus, the United Right 
used discriminatory legalism in 2015–2020.
The Human Rights Commissioner, NGOs, some journalists and private media 
try to combat hate speech, educate and promote high standards of pluralism and 
open the public debate with respect for opponents. The Commissioner is the only 
institution who tries to combat hate speech effectively but he is regularly criticized 
and discredited for these actions by the ruling party politicians. He monitors hate 
16 The radio station is headed by Father Tadeusz Rydzyk and its programme consists of prayers, 
discussions and polemics. Radio Maryja can be heard both in Poland and abroad. The radio station and 
the television station, TV Trwam, contributed to the Law and Justice party’s victories in presidential and 
parliamentary elections in 2005 and 2015. Radio Maria and TV Trwam are criticized for spreading anti-Se-
mitic views, Holocaust denial and hate speech while ignoring complaints. 
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speech, educates, intervenes in the cases discontinued by the prosecutor’s office, 
cooperates with experts and organizations that deal with verbal violence. 
At the time of submitting the article for printing, the 5-year term of the current 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Adam Bodnar, expired (on 9 September 2020). 
The Parliament did not select a new person for this position yet. It may be a prob-
lem because the Senate belongs to the opposition and the selection of candidate 
by the Sejm is made with the consent of the Senate. Thus, following Article 3.6 of 
the Law on the Commissioner, Bodnar stays in the office until the appointment of 
the new Commissioner for Human Rights. However, a group of MPs demands the 
Constitutional Court to delete this legal basis, leaving the office without its head. It 
may be another institution in the future, the head of which will be a person whose 
appointment could give rise to constitutional doubts.
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